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With its population of some eight million and with only a 
rudimentary industrial base, Canada 
was completely unprepared for 
war in August 1914, unprepared 
psychologically, militarily, and 
organizationally. No such conflict 
had happened before, and no one 
in government or out could have 
contemplated the reality of the 
next four years of war. Those who 
thought ahead in that summer of 1914 
envisaged a few short, sharp battles 
on land, the triumph of Britain’s 
Royal Navy at sea, and a triumphal 
march into Berlin led by the French, 
Russian, and British armies. The only 
question in most minds was whether 
the Canadian volunteers would get to 
the front in time to test their mettle 
before the German Kaiser’s Prussian 
hordes had run up the white flag in 
precipitous surrender. The justness 
of the cause was unquestioned and 
Canada, as a British colony, was in 
the war at once, bound legally by 
Britain’s declaration of hostilities. 
Even in Quebec, especially Montreal, 
where pro-imperial sentiment found 
less popular traction and fewer vocal 
advocates among francophones, 
there seemed initially to be little 
doubt. Across the country, young 
Canadians hurried to sign up, hustled 
along by uncompromising appeals to 
patriotism and by the moral certitude 
of a just cause and an imminent 
victory.
The economy was in the doldrums 
when war began, and the inevitable 
interruptions of trade made matters 
worse. It took a year or more before 
the war-induced boom began to take 
hold, grain exports increased, and the 
first munitions were sold. Canada’s 
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Abstract: On the world wars at home, 
we were conscious of just scratching 
the surface. In part, brevity reflected 
scholarship: the many issues, great and 
small, that generations of historians 
have failed to elucidate, or those on 
which popular myth, passionately 
argued, still crowd out sober judgement. 
In part too, we self-censored, trying not 
to repeat entries elsewhere in the book. 
Even in skimming trees we covered 
plenty, although arguably – especially 
for World War I – not quite enough. 
Industry, women, local history, the 
economy, home defence, governance, 
administration, and wartime politics 
in both wars could all stand more 
room than time and sheaf space easily 
allowed. Of the summative challenges 
we faced in the book, these entries were 
among the greatest.
Résumé : Nous étions conscients d’à 
peine aborder le sujet des guerres 
mondiales au pays. La concision reflétait 
en partie l’état de la recherche : les 
nombreux sujets, petits et grands, que 
des générations d’historiens n’ont pu 
éclaircir, ou ceux pour lesquels les 
légendes populaires, défendues avec 
passion, laissent peu de place aux 
analyses sereines. Nous nous sommes 
aussi en partie censurés afin d’éviter 
de répéter ce qui figurait ailleurs dans 
l’ouvrage. Même en mesurant notre 
prose, nous avons couvert beaucoup de 
terrain, quoique, sans doute – pour la 
Première Guerre mondiale en particulier 
– insuffisamment. L’industrie, les 
femmes, l’histoire locale, l’économie, 
la défense du pays, la gouvernance, 
l’administration et les politiques du 
temps de guerre, et ce pour les deux 
guerres, méritaient tous davantage 
d’attention que ne le permettaient 
le temps et l’espace. Ces sujets se 
classent parmi les principaux défis 
auxquels nous avons dû faire face dans 
cet ouvrage.
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production of artillery shells, after 
November 1915 wholly controlled 
by the Imperial Munitions Board, 
would amount to over $1 billion 
worth, a huge sum by any standard. 
The war eventually created labour 
shortages as men went into the army 
and factories went on double shifts, 
and workers, male and female, came 
to the cities from rural areas. That, in 
turn, created a farm labour shortage 
that left farmers, struggling to plant 
and then bring in crops that could 
command good prices for once, 
desperate for help. Wartime inflation 
pushed up the price of food, leading 
city dwellers, many of them earning 
better wages than before the war, 
to curse farmers for their financial 
opportunism and supposed failure 
to enlist for military service. The 
wartime calls for “A New National 
Policy” of lower tariffs and the 
postwar rise of farmer progressivism 
had their roots in this strain.
Another factor was conscription. 
To farmers, compulsory military 
service meant that even less labour 
would be available for their use. 
Their argument that food was as 
much a war-winning weapon as 
armaments was true enough, but it 
received little broader credence in the 
feverish atmosphere of 1917. Victory 
then was everything, and Canada 
needed every recruit it could possibly 
find to be at the front. Including 
French-speaking Canadians? That 
was a problem. Quebec, while happy 
enough to operate war factories, was 
not sending volunteers to the army in 
anything like the numbers of English 
Canada. There were no hard data 
available for public discussion, but 
none truly believed that francophone 
volunteers amounted to more than 
25,000 or so, if that. Québécois 
nationalists noted, with some justice, 
that Canada’s enlistment figures were 
badly skewed: it was the British-born 
who were enlisting, they argued, and 
not the English-speaking Canadian-
born. Moreover,  the language 
of the army was English, there 
were almost no French-speaking 
senior officers, Minister of Militia 
and Defence Sam Hughes was an 
Orangeman who hated Catholics, 
and the real threat to French Canada 
lay in Ontario where Regulation 17 
forced English on French-speaking 
children. Why should 
French Canadians enlist 
to fight the Prussians 
when it was in Ontario 
that the French language 
was actually threatened? 
The passage of the Military 
Service Act in August 1917 and 
the imposition of conscription 
split the country. The farmers won 
sweeping exemptions just before the 
election; the francophones did not. 
Both would be called up wholesale 
when the Germans’ 1918 offensives 
threatened to win the war. For good 
measure, the Borden government 
guaranteed itself election victory 
when its Military Voters Act and 
its Wartime Elections Act gave the 
vote to soldiers to use where most 
helpful for the government, took 
away the votes of recent immigrants, 
and granted them to women relatives 
of soldiers. The December 1917 
election also hit a new low in racism, 
Quebec being damned as a slacker 
province and Liberal leader and 
anti-conscription stalwart Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier as the Kaiser’s henchman.
The vote for women may have 
been an election- winning tactic in 
1917, but it was also implemented 
in recognition of the role women 
had played in the war. Working 
in factories, replacing men as tram 
drivers, knitting socks for soldiers, 
or working in the fields, women 
had earned the vote. Other social 
reforms also moved quickly forward 
in the hothouse atmosphere of the 
war. Prohibition was necessary so 
scarce alcohol could be used for 
munitions. Income taxes came into 
place to make those who earned 
most carry their share of the war’s 
costs. Implemented in 1917 after 
the Americans came into the war 
and imposed it on their citizens, 
food rationing in theory meant that 
scarce goods could be more equally 
shared. And the state intruded into 
hitherto forbidden areas: for example, 
as venereal disease spread rapidly, 
keeping men from the front, Ottawa 
The Rod Turner – Frances Loring
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and the provinces entered into their 
first shared cost program to counter it.
The war created an enormous 
gap between those at home and 
those who fought. The bitterness 
of returning soldiers in 1919, their 
rage against the French Canadians, 
the immigrants, the profiteers, the 
slackers, embittered Canadian life 
for a generation. It divided city from 
country, French from English, worker 
from management, and young from 
old in ways that sparked regional 
resentment, political division, and 
social and labour conflict. This was 
true even as Canadians celebrated 
justly their achievements in arms, 
the return of their heroes, and the 
role claimed by the Dominion in 
imperial affairs as the result of its 
wartime efforts. Remembrance and 
commemoration were civic duties 
even as tight-fisted governments 
shrank the  mil i tary ,  reduced 
budgets, and struggled to ensure 
that payments to veterans did not 
crush the exchequer. Close-lipped 
old soldiers might choose to forget 
the war that those who were not there 
never understood, but its scars and 
impacts echoed through the interwar 
period just the same. Conscription in 
the Second World War was an issue 
precisely because of the memories of 
the First World War. Because of the 
1914–1918 experience, the public and 
the government had some sense of 
what might be expected.
Canada  in  1939  was  s t i l l 
caught in the Great Depression 
with unemployment high and the 
economy groaning. There was 
no enthusiasm anywhere for the 
coming war, certainly not in French 
Canada or on the farms across 
the nation. The wave of public 
enthusiasm that greeted the Munich 
agreement of September 1938 – the 
pact that stripped the Sudetenland 
from Czechoslovakia in a triumph 
of Anglo-French appeasement – 
demonstrated that such sentiments 
were far more widely shared than 
in 1914. There was also growing 
fear that appeasement would not 
be enough. The very real sense that 
Adolf Hitler and the Nazis were 
a menace to democracy increased 
sharply when Hitler tore up the 
September agreements by marching 
into Prague in March 1939. War 
in Europe was coming; Japanese 
expansion in China and its growing 
naval power suggested, especially 
to those living along the vulnerable 
West Coast, that it might not be long 
in engulfing the Pacific either.
The public’s attitude at the 
beginning of the war in Europe in 
Forging 6-inch Shells, Toronto – George Reid
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September 1939 was one of fearful 
resignation. The memory of the 
terrible casualties of the First World 
War hung heavily over the country, 
and in Quebec the scars of the 1917 
conscription crisis were still fresh. For 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, the 
wartime task was to bring Canada 
into and through the war undivided, 
or at least substantially less divided 
than in the earlier struggle. He had 
to bring Quebec along as Canada 
entered the war against Germany, 
while managing the enthusiasms 
of more imperialistic Canadians 
who would, then as before, press 
Ottawa for automatic commitments 
and maximal efforts on behalf of the 
mother country. He could not – and 
did not want to – dissociate Canada 
from the British position, nor could 
he endorse it so closely or so soon 
as to divide his party, his base of 
support in Quebec, or his ability to 
conduct the war at home. The Statute 
of Westminster of 1931 made Canada 
autonomous in foreign policy, but the 
statute’s powers had yet to be tested. 
King’s answer in September 1939 
as British and French ultimatums 
to Germany for its retreat from an 
invaded Poland expired and the 
great powers marched again to war, 
was to call Parliament, permitting 
Canadians, at least nominally, to 
decide if their country should join 
the war. The result of the discussion 
was preordained and entirely 
academic, given his party’s strength 
in the House and the Conservatives’ 
united support for hostilities, but 
the week-long delay, leading to a 
declaration of war on 10 September, 
one week after Britain, demonstrated 
autonomy, appeased the imperialists, 
and mollified – more or less – critics 
in Quebec. Whether the country’s 
national interests were yet at stake in 
a war in Europe was another question 
entirely.
In effect, Canada had played no 
part in prewar diplomacy, and went 
to war when Britain did for much the 
same reasons as in 1914. The nature of 
the German regime (and that of Italy 
and Japan as well) would become 
truly apparent only later, despite 
growing public evidence, much of it 
disgracefully ignored in Canada as 
elsewhere, of the plight of Europe’s 
Jews. The extent and pace of fascist 
ambitions could no longer be denied 
in September 1939, however, and 
these surely were worth opposing, 
even for former proto-isolationists 
like King. Anglo-Canadian opinion 
would never have countenanced non-
involvement in any case, and King 
was always aware of the strength of 
this view. A wily prime minister had 
made a wise call at the right time for 
the right reason; that he could have 
done no less was beside the point. 
Political adroitness notwithstanding, 
entering the war was one thing; 
fighting it was another.
Mackenzie King’s war was 
initially to be one of “limited liability.” 
Canada would do its part but it 
would not risk tearing itself asunder 
by virtue of its effort, as it had in the 
First World War. The prime minister 
would have preferred not to send an 
army division overseas early in the 
Top left: Mackenzie King and members 
of the Cabinet broadcasting messages 
to the Canadian people following the 
special emergency Cabinet meeting 
following Great Britain’s declaration 
of war, 3 September 1939. From left 
to right, C.G. Power, Ernest Lapointe, 
Mackenzie King, and Norman Rogers.
Bottom left: C.D. Howe was the minister 
of munitions and supply during the war, 
but his galvanizing spark made him 
Canada’s “minister of everything.”
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struggle, but his Cabinet insisted. 
Even so, King forced the British to 
agree that the British Commonwealth 
Air Training Plan (BCATP), huge 
and expensive as it was, would be 
Canada’s primary role. Nor would 
there be any conscription for overseas 
service. King had promised this in 
March 1939 (as had the Opposition 
leader, Dr. R.J. Manion), and he 
repeated it in September. These 
attitudes persisted into the spring of 
1940, long enough for the Liberals to 
be re-elected in a landslide. But the 
Germans swallowed Denmark and 
Norway in April and stunningly 
crushed the Low Countries and 
France in May and June. Britain 
was now alone, Canada and its 11 
million people now its major ally. 
The budget caps on war expenditures 
came off, the economy began to hum, 
and Canada was wholeheartedly 
in the war. C.D. Howe, hitherto 
the transport minister, became the 
minister of munitions and supply, 
and “C.D.” provided the galvanizing 
spark. He would become Canada’s 
“minister of everything.”
He did not have much to work 
with. There were at least 400,000 
unemployed and one million on 
relief in 1939, while only 3.8 million 
had gainful employment, 2 million 
of those in agriculture. The gross 
national product (GNP) was $5.6 
billion, and government spending 
was in the range of $680 million 
a year. The war altered matters 
dramatically: the GNP in 1945 was 
$11.8 billion, more than double 
the prewar figure. Unemployment 
had disappeared and 5.1 million 
people had work, with 3.2 million 
in industry. The manufacturing 
sector had almost doubled in size, 
and war industry at its October 1943 
peak employed 1.2 million men 
and women or 13.3 percent of the 
population over 14 years of age. And, 
of course, 1.1 million men and women 
served in the wartime armed forces.
The government needed money 
to pay for the war’s costs, and 
increased taxes provided much of it. 
Ottawa’s authority was constrained 
by the British North America Act’s 
separation of powers between the 
federal and provincial governments—
until the federal budget of 29 April 
1941 announced Ottawa’s intention 
to levy the taxes required to fund 
the war, paying to every province 
that agreed to surrender its income, 
corporate, and succession taxes an 
annual payment equal to its previous 
revenues from these fields. This 
was to be a voluntary agreement, 
Ottawa pronounced piously, but 
any province that failed to agree 
could face the burden of saddling its 
citizens with double taxation. There 
were pro forma protests, but the 
provinces caved in. The Dominion-
Provincial Taxation Agreement 
Act, 1942 formalized the deal. The 
government now had the taxation 
room it needed to fight the war. 
Excise, sales, and retail purchase 
taxes were increased or imposed. 
Raw tobacco faced a ten cents a 
pound levy, cigarette taxes increased 
from $5 to $6 a thousand; cameras, 
photographs, and radio tubes had a 
ten percent tax added to their cost, 
and a luxury tax on virtually all 
entertainment added 20 percent to the 
cost of movies and sporting events. 
A War Exchange Tax, ordinarily 10 
percent, raised revenue and deterred 
unnecessary imports, thus preserving 
scarce US dollars.
The rates of corporation and 
income taxes increased dramatically. 
At the beginning of the war, a married 
man with two children paid no 
income tax at all unless he was in 
the upper brackets; if he earned 
$3,000, his income tax was $10. Four 
years later, after tax increases had 
squeezed hard, the $3,000 a year 
man was paying $334 in income 
tax and an additional amount of 
$1,200 in “compulsory savings,” 
a surcharge in the form of a loan 
to be repaid at the end of the war. 
The ingenuity of the federal finance 
department was almost as unlimited 
as the government’s  need for 
Performing One Half of the Operation 
Known as “Applying the Tracks” to a 
Valentine Tank – Frederick Taylor
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money. Corporation taxes increased 
from 18 to 40 percent, generating 
$636 million—or nearly half of all 
corporate profits—in 1943. Excess 
profits taxes produced more revenue. 
All profits in excess of 116 2/3 percent 
of standard profits (the average of 
profit from the not-so-buoyant years 
from 1936 to 1939) were taxed at 100 
percent. Corporations, however, 
were to receive a 20 percent rebate 
after the war. “No great fortunes,” the 
finance minister said, perhaps with 
more optimism than was justified, 
“can be accumulated out of wartime 
profits.” High corporate and personal 
taxes, while they did not stop some 
from getting rich out of the war, 
tried to ensure that a measure of 
equal treatment prevailed. So too 
did the freeze on prices and wages, 
imposed in October 1941. From 
September 1939 to the imposition of 
wage and price control, the cost of 
living went up 17.8 percent; but, for 
the rest of the war, the increase was 
only 2.8 percent, the most successful 
record of fighting inflation among 
all the belligerents. Essentially, the 
managers of the wartime economy 
had learned from the errors of The 
First World War: they taxed heavily 
and managed inflation, and the 
nation and the war effort benefitted. 
With all this money coming in, 
wartime spending in Ottawa reached 
well above $5 billion in 1945, almost 
nine times 1939 spending.
P r o d u c t i o n  i n c r e a s e d 
dramatically in every sector of the 
economy between 1939 and 1945. 
Good weather helped produce 
bumper crops of grain – 556 million 
bushels of grain in 1942, every bit 
of which found a market at home 
or overseas. Pork production more 
than doubled while beef rose by 
one-third and agricultural exports 
rose threefold. In the iron and steel 
industries, pig iron and steel ingot 
production more than doubled over 
the course of the war, and a nation 
that in 1939 had built no merchant 
ships, by 1944 had put 345 into the 
water; aircraft production reached 
14,700 by the beginning of 1945; 
and Canada’s auto plants turned 
out 45,710 armoured vehicles and 
707,000 military trucks of all kinds. 
The Canadian army ran on these 
vehicles, and so too did much of the 
British army.
The total of war production in 
Canada was $10.9 billion by 1945, 
placing Canada fourth among the 
Allies with one-seventh of total 
Commonwealth production. The 
Canadian military used only a third 
of this bounty, and so rich had 
Canada become (and so short of hard 
currency to pay for anything were 
Britain and its Empire) that virtually 
all the remainder was given away 
as gifts to Britain, or as Mutual Aid 
to Britain and the Allies. Mutual 
Aid was the Canadian equivalent of 
the Americans’ Lend-Lease, and in 
percentage terms was more generous. 
But there was self-interest here too: 
war production in Canada was an 
investment in full employment and 
in infrastructure-building at home.
Canada was at war, straining 
every  s inew for  v ic tory  but , 
extraordinarily, the country had 
never been so prosperous. There 
was work for everyone – fathers, 
mothers, daughters – with as much 
overtime available in the factories as 
individuals could handle. Average 
wages increased dramatically, rising 
from $956 in 1938 to $1,525 in 1943. 
People had the money to eat better 
than they had during the Depression, 
even if food rationing put limits on 
what meat, butter, sugar, coffee, 
tea, as well as appliances, autos, 
gasoline, and other commodities 
were available. But if Canadians 
could not buy everything they 
wanted, they could save for the 
future. The government sold $12.5 
billion in Victory Bonds that everyone 
purchased (down to chi ldren 
spending 25 cents on war savings 
stamps), and every bond drive was 
oversubscribed. At the same time, 
bank accounts increased, a cushion 
for the expected postwar downturn. 
Many flirted with the black market, 
trying to get meat or gas or auto tires, 
but the government’s Wartime Prices 
and Trade Board kept careful watch 
on profiteers. 
Everyone worried about their 
husbands, sons, and brothers in 
action overseas, but Canadians 
listened to the radio – Lorne Greene 
reading the CBC news was “the voice 
of doom” but Bert Pearl and “The 
Happy Gang” offered good fun and 
music – and their kids followed the 
adventures of “L for Lanky” about the 
crews of Bomber Command  when 
they were not collecting tin cans, 
fruit baskets, or milkweed pods for 
recycling and war purposes. Teenage 
girls put on bobby socks while 
city boys wore zoot suits with big 
shoulders and an exaggerated drape 
in the pants that somehow defied 
clothing rationing, and some zoot-
suiters fought with servicemen over 
girls. Most young people danced to 
swing at large dancehalls or listened 
to Glenn Miller records. Parents 
worried about their daughters having 
sex or, worse, an illegitimate child 
in an era before birth control was 
reliable, while others fretted over 
hasty wartime marriages and feared 
that divorce would rise high enough 
to shake the social order. A wife with 
a husband overseas worried that 
he was having affairs with English 
women (and later Italian, French, 
Belgian, Dutch, and German women). 
Their servicemen spouses feared 
that slackers and the “zombies,” as 
home defence conscripts were called 
derisively, could be preying on their 
lonely wives.  Certainly there was 
immorality and many marriages 
foundered under the stress of long 
absence (some soldiers in the 1st 
Division were away from Canada 
Opposite: “Loyal citizens do not hoard” 
– Rationing signs in the window of a 
Montreal shop, May 1942.
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for six years), but most, like Canada, 
survived.
Doctors made house calls (but 
in wartime people could pay their 
fees as many could not in the 1930s) 
and they received extra gas coupons 
and access to tires so they could do 
so. Comic books, called “Canadian 
whites” because scarce dyes went to 
war production, reached young boys 
and girls, most about superheroes 
fighting evil Nazis or Japanese 
militarists. Clergymen and social 
workers worried about how the 
absence of fathers overseas might 
affect the way children developed, 
and juvenile delinquency did show 
wartime increases, peaking in 1942. 
Life not only went on; it was better 
than before the war, even with almost 
everyone conscious of what was at 
stake. 
The  war  changed Canada 
dramatically. Hundreds of thousands 
left rural Canada for the factories in 
the city, and housing in the cities and 
towns became a scarce and expensive 
commodity despite government 
rent control. Women began to work 
in war plants, sometimes bringing 
their babies along to daycare centres 
at the work site. The scarcity of 
men, serving in uniform, opened 
up jobs to women that had been 
unimaginable in 1939 – from street 
car drivers to aircraft designers – and 
1.4 million women were employed, 
a participation rate of almost one in 
three, at the wartime peak in 1945. 
When the war ended and the men 
came back, many, but not all, of those 
jobs disappeared. Later feminist 
scholars notwithstanding, most 
women wanted to escape the factory 
to have a home after the war, along 
with a husband and a family, and to 
live what was seen as a normal life. 
Labour participation rates for women 
never returned to their prewar levels 
just the same. For women as for men, 
the struggle had been transformative.
U n i o n i z a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d 
dramatically, with government 
clearing the way with an order-in-
council (PC 1007 of 17 February 1944) 
that confirmed employees’ rights to 
form unions and laid out the rules for 
defining and certifying bargaining 
units. Labour peace could keep vital 
production going, and where there 
were production bottlenecks and 
failures, one way around them was 
to create Crown corporations. A 
shortage of rubber? Set up a Crown 
company to produce synthetic rubber. 
Wood veneers for aircraft were in 
scarce supply? A Crown corporation 
could do the job. Machine tools? 
C.D. Howe’s Citadel Merchandising 
could get them and make sure they 
went where they were most needed. 
In all, 28 Crown corporations came 
into being during the war, some 
manufacturing, some purchasing 
and distributing, others supervising 
and controlling. The establishment 
of Crown companies, operating with 
Top left: “Invest in Victory Bonds and 
Drive a Nail in Hitler’s Coffin” – Selling 
Victory Bonds in Prince Rupert, BC, 
1941.
Below left: Ram tanks in production at 
the Montreal Locomotive Works, July 
1942.
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great flexibility outside 
the usual bureaucratic 
restraints, allowed for 
efficiencies. The Liberal 
government benefitted 
from all this economic 
success and public wealth. 
People complained and 
the Opposition suggested 
it could have done it all 
better, of course. But King 
and the Liberals seemed in 
control – and were. 
T h e r e  w e r e  s t i l l 
cha l l enges  to  King ’ s 
dominance. In September 
1939, Premier Maurice 
Dupless i s  in  Quebec 
ca l led  an e lec t ion to 
protest what he saw as 
Ottawa’s centralization 
of power, with the war 
as  an  excuse .  King’s 
Quebec ministers went 
into the fray and smashed 
the  Union  Nat iona le 
w i t h  t h e i r  p r o m i s e s 
against conscription. In 
January 1940, Ontario 
Premier Mitch Hepburn 
complained that Canada was doing 
nothing in the war and his legislature 
passed a condemnatory motion 
that King used as an excuse for a 
snap election of his own. He won 
massively, happily for him just 
before the war in Europe turned 
against the Allies. King soon had 
to pass the National Resources 
Mobilization Act, implementing 
home defence conscription, and 
his government moved quickly to 
squelch (relatively minor) protests 
in Quebec by locking up Montreal’s 
showboat mayor, Camillien Houde, 
who had encouraged his citizens 
not to register. The question of 
conscription did not go away, with 
a conscription plebiscite in April 
1942 and a major government crisis 
the next month, as well as a genuine 
reinforcement shortage in the fall 
of 1944 that came close to bringing 
the government down. King bobbed 
and weaved and sent 16,000 home 
defence conscripts overseas, but he 
held the government and country 
together in a fashion that guaranteed 
him his place among Canada’s great 
leaders.
King also used the wartime 
opportunity to begin to put social 
welfare measures into law. In 1940, 
he secured provincial consent to 
amend the constitution and put 
Unemployment Insurance on the 
federal government’s books, knowing 
that wartime full employment could 
fill the coffers so that benefits could be 
paid out when (no one thought it was 
if) bad times returned with peace. In 
1944, with the social democratic Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation 
showing strength in the opinion 
polls and forming the government 
in Saskatchewan and the Opposition 
in Ontario, King’s government 
passed a family allowance bill, 
giving mothers a monthly 
payment for each child; 
for many women, this was 
the first money of their 
own they had ever had, 
and it was intended to be 
used to buy milk, cribs, 
blankets, baby shoes, and a 
myriad of items that would 
keep farms and factories 
working after the war. 
This one scheme was to 
cost Ottawa almost half the 
total 1939 federal budget, 
an indicator of how the war 
had changed everything. 
And because Ottawa’s 
mandarins feared a return 
of economic depression, 
t h e r e  w a s  a  h o s t  o f 
other plans designed to 
spend money to create 
jobs: a Veterans Charter 
to reward servicemen 
and servicewomen with 
clothing,  money,  and 
training; money for home 
building; money to convert 
industry to peacetime 
production; money for 
great public projects; money for 
everything. It worked – the economic 
downturn all had expected did not 
materialize, and Mackenzie King and 
the Liberals won the 1945 election, 
narrowly, to be sure, but deservedly 
just the same.
This article originally appeared in The Oxford 
Companion to Canadian Military History 
(2011) and is reprinted with the permission 
of Oxford University Press.
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